Abstract
Introduction
This study aims to offer a historical reconstitution of the rise and fall of North American Postmodern Legal Movements, specially the Critical Legal Studies. First, it will analyze the dawn of Critical Legal Studies within the context of postmodern Critical Legal Thinking (as opposed to the hegemonic view of Legal Education). In sequence, it explores possible reasons for crits (name given to participants of Critical Legal Studies movement) recrudescence. Although situated in the Anglo-Saxon Legal System (characterized mainly by customs and precedents as sources of Law), the crits movement provides important insights that can be used by legal scholars in the Romano-Germanic Legal System (characterized mainly by positive codifications and doctrine).
Nowadays, one lives undeniably in a moment of ideological crisis. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, neoliberalism has sought to impose itself as the only feasible ethos in a globalized context, marked by both the decay of dictatorial political systems in the Second and Third Worlds and the affirmation of cultural diversity. The progressive intelligentsia strove to adjust itself to the demoliberal system and to the logic of the market 1 , adopting paradigms of "weak reformism," 2 such as those promoted by social democracy. However, advancing conservatism (stimulated by the economic recession) is a sign that the paradigms of "savage capitalism" and "capitalism with a human face" spread over the last few years are not enough to afford the needs of the population.
Therefore, the failure of the Soviet Union did not represent the "end of history," 3 the triumph of the United States, and the pax americana achievement. Nevertheless, the theoretical indigence of established political parties (right-winged and left-winged in the political spectrum) prevents the community from enjoying new models of social organization able of overcoming the aporias of the Democratic Rule of Law.
Legal education has its share of the blame in this process: presenting the normative order as an autopoietic, rational and necessary system, devoid of contradictions or gaps (and not as the result of contingent and reversible political decisions, commitments assumed in the struggle for power), law schools eventually convinced their students that this would be the best (or "least worst") of possible worlds, the inevitable consequence of a logical evolution. This process explains the success, in recent years, of doctrines such as the Economic Analysis of Law, which seeks to naturalize the most harmful characteristics of the bourgeois legal order and to represent man as "eternal rational utilities maximizer"
4 . In such a scenario, it is necessary to rehabilitate critical legal thinking in order to foster the transformative and emancipatory dimension of Law. Considered by many as the most radical view of postmodern legal movements, Critical Legal Studies can bring fundamental contributions to the transformation of the current institutional arrangement.
Critical Theories of Law
According to Antônio Carlos Wolkmer, critical theories of Law 5 have begun to emerge in Europe and the Americas since the 1960s, in face of the inability of normativist doctrines to respond to elementary questions -notably of moral and ideological natureindispensable to comprehend the legal universe 6 in force during that period. Its rise was 4 A sum of the theoretical assumptions held by Economic Analysis of Law can be found in: POSNER, Richard.
2007. 'Problemas de filosofia do direito.' Tradução Jefferson Camargo. São Paulo: Martins Fontes. 5 Wolkmer defines Critical Theories of Law as follows: "In this way, one can conceptualize critical theory as the operative pedagogical instrument (theoretical-practical) that allows a historical take of consciousness for stagnant and mythical subjects, triggering processes that lead to the formation of social agents possessing a rationalized, anti-dogmatic, participatory and transformative world view. It is a proposal that is not based on abstractions, on priori reasoning of pure and simple mental elaboration, but on historicalconcrete experience, on daily insurgent practice, on conflicts and social interactions, and on essential human needs." Kelsen's definition of the legal norm as a coercive command aimed at social pacification begins to be questioned 8 . Gradually is restored the perception conforming to which in the collective life exists a diverse range of spontaneous forms of conflicts resolution, beyond positive Law 9 . Thereby, some scholars become more aware to the historicial and political views of Law (moving away from the belief of a transcultural "legal rationality", capable of justifying jurisdictional decisions at any time or place).
Wolkmer refers to a transcontinental wave of legal criticism, "heterogeneous plurality of insurgent movements," which despite procedural differences, faces common gnosiological and political-ideological problems: in an effort to rescue the sociopolitical sense of the Law, all these currents will oppose legal positivism, jusnaturalism and sociological realism. The three main approaches to the legal phenomenon that have developed in the history of Western civilization share the common effort to "deideologize" the jurisdictional activity, to interpret it as a technical (the belief that the sentence would represent a syllogistic operation, etc.) or prudential activity (the practical reason, the Aristotelian phronesis applied to the lawsuit). Legal Dogmatism is based on "founding fictions of truth" -such as the belief according to which legal knowledge would be neutral and impartial, standing above the conflicts of interest that cross the social body. For the critical theories of Law, the desacralization of normative Columbus Langdell at the end of the nineteenth century, dominated the legal education scenario almost incontestably. Supported by a formalist perspective -which sought to stimulate "legal reasoning" in students, it set aside moral and political-ideological issues associated with the normative universe -the Socratic method seemed to be the most appropriate for a liberal cosmovision. It shared the belief that for every legal problem there would be a single adequate, technical and accessible solution to any rational subject. In its question-and-answer game, it would stimulate hierarchy, paternalism, and 10 The Socratic Method espoused by the American law schools has little relation with the maieutics developed by Socrates in Classical Antiquity. It is based on the case study: by analyzing emblematic common law cases before the classes, the students undergo daily oral assessments made by the teachers. In this way, they must learn to identify the essential elements of the investigated precedents, by debugging the fundamental principles that rule the legal system. Theory. Despite the countless theoretical and practical differences, these currents share similar pluralistic, contextual and non-essentialist conceptions of Law. The element of faith, typically modern in a self-transparent and self-legitimating juridical consciousness, the basis for the construction of a legal order based on coherence and integrity, is rejected by the five groups, which is why they are associated to the postmodernism 14 .
In fact, modern legal theorists believe in the existence of 'right answers' and 'right interpretations'. Applying instrumental rationality to the Law, they expect to give legal knowledge "scientific objectivity." Their works are marked by great dichotomies: subject/object; Law/society; substance/process; core/penumbra etc. Grotius, for example, emulating geometry reasoning, intends to construct a Natural Law that would subsist "even if God did not exist", that is, a self-evident normative system, capable of sustaining itself exclusively by its rationality. There would be a trans social order of Law, not linked with cultural values, but composed of rules, principles and doctrines. By means of deontic logic (in conceptual models such as Langdell's) or by practical reason (in normative models such as that elaborated by Oliver W. Holmes's legal realism, which replaced formalism with pragmatic instrumentalism), the jurist would be able to access such order.
In the 1970s, this paradigm began to collapse, being replaced by new models capable of coordinating Law and culture:
The problem [in the 1970s] was that traditional legal analysis had failed to recognize that law contributes to the construction of social reality. Traditional analysis of legal problems adopted a 'naive' understanding of the relationship between law and culture. Most legal scholars assumed that the 14 As Minda affirms: "Postmodernism is an aesthetic practice and condition that is opposed to 'Grand Theory', structural patterns, or foundational knowledges. Postmodern legal critics employ local, small-scale problem-solving strategies to arise new questions about the relation of law, politics and culture. They offer a new interpretative aesthetic for reconceptualizing the practice of legal interpretation" (MINDA. 1996. 'Postmodern legal movements: Law and Jurisprudence at the Century's End.' Ney York: NYU Press, p. 03). York; London: New York University Press. 17 "Young, bright, with egos to match, the Crits saw law as the gateway to power, which had been exploited by the Empire to engage in class oppression. The ostensible objectivity of the legal system protects a market system that marginalizes the underclass, particularly minorities and women. Laws, decisions, and regulations are indeterminate, full of choices and options that are denied the oppressed. 
Critical Legal Studies
The Critical Legal Studies Movement -"the gang of leftists from the 60s and young people with nostalgia for events of 15 years ago", as described by Duncan Kennedy, one of its main articulators -interprets the jurist not as keeper, but as architect of social building 20 . In an authentically democratic community, legal knowledge must assist the population in establishing institutions that in fact represent the potential of citizens.
Thus, it needs to commit to innovation by exploiting the utopian counterfactualities of the system. Influenced by American legal realism and the Law and Society movement, the crits attempt to present themselves as a third way between liberal formalism and Marxist-Leninist determinism, Scylla and Charybdis. Unlike Orthodox Marxism, they do not comprehend Law as an epiphenomenon of the class struggle, devoid of its own density. Between "base" and "superstructure", "mode of production" and "symbols of culture", "factual domain" and "normative domain", there are complex and multidirectional relationships. In this way, the critique of Law not only tears away the imaginary flowers that conceal the currents (to use Marx's terminology), but effectively produces transformative political actions. By giving meaning to social interactions, world 18 Louis B. Schartz will reject the movement with the following words: "At the level of style, the authors seemed addicted to jargon, shallow psychologizing, a moralistic preachiness, and the practice of citing each other incestuously when not citing selected paladins of political science, sociology, and psychology such as Hegel, Marx, Engels, Durkheim, Weber, Piaget, and Marcuse. The high moral tone was often compromised, however, by a weakness for misrepresenting law, fact, or history whenever necessary to save the chosen political thesis" (SCHWARTZ, Louis B. .
Deconstruction and utopia
Many, supportive or contrary to the movement, will say that crits, though skilled in framing obstacles, are hesitant in proposing alternatives. For Owen M. Fiss, for example, the Critical Legal Studies movement would be nothing more than a "radicalism for yuppies", which, rejecting the notion of Law as a common ideal, the grammar of public morality, would be linked to nihilism and negativism. Fiss does not support crits' thesis that the Law would not be able to provide "correct answers" (in his view, the primary function of legal knowledge is to guide the activity of judges)
32
. Genovese, in his turn, argues that the concepts of "participatory democracy" and "equity", repeatedly invoked by crits as opposed to the liberal order, remain captiously uncertain 33 . The utopian imagination of the movement would not be able to become executed in feasible projects and would be lost in the autophagic deconstruction of reason. This is also Stuart This observation is by no means unfounded: a substantial part of the intellectuals associated with the movement is committed to the practice of trashing, a form of analysis, which, inspired by Derrida's deconstructionism, seeks to expose the mystification techniques underlying legal formalism. It is a tactic to destabilize rationalizations, showing that legal education is not a scientific activity, rather, it is a form of advocacy:
Take specific arguments very seriously in their own terms; discover they are actually foolish ([tragi]-comic); and then look for some (external observer's) order (not the germ of truth) in the internally contradictory, incoherent chaos we've exposed
35
. Anthony Chase's stance may serve as an example. In the author's view, legal language -like ordinary language -is fraught with ambiguity. The scholar committed to anti-formalist orientation needs to expose the indeterminacy, contradiction, and marginality of legal discourse, revealing how the apparent technicality of jurisdictional activity conceals class interests: "(…) law is an open-textured and infinitely "manipulable" system (at least at the level of language and the understood meanings of words) whereby virtually any judicial result can be "logically justified" on any given set of facts".
36
The trashing is not meant to be positive or edifying -it projects, on the legal order of liberalism, the look that a structuralist ethnographer would devote to the myths and rites of a silvicultural population. Opposing to the exegesis commonly defended by 34 RUSSELL, J. Stuart. 1986 . 'The Critical Legal Studies challenge to contemporary mainstream legal philosophy. ' Ottawa Law Review, Ottawa, vol. 18, n. 01, p. 22. 35 KELMAN, Mark G. 1984 . 'Trashing.' Standford Law Review, Palo Alto, vol. 36, n. 01/02, p. 293. 36 CHASE, Anthony. 1986 . 'What should a law teacher believe? ' Nova Law Review, Davie, vol. 10, n. 02, p. 412. 
Neoliberalism and the crisis of Critical Legal Studies
In the 1990s, a neoliberal wave took over American law schools. The Harvard case will be emblematic: under the leadership of the Federalist Society, the institution will dismiss 37 KELMAN, Mark G. 1984. 'Trashing.' Standford Law Review, Palo Alto, vol. 36, n. 01/02, p. 330. 38 Genovese argues for the existence of an irreconcilable contradiction between Unger and the other crits. a substantial portion of teachers associated to Critical Legal Studies 40 from its administrative body. The fact is that in several legal education centers in the West, the same process will take place in an effort to restrain critical theories of Law. As suggested in the introduction to this paper, neoliberalism presented itself, when confronted with socialist decline, as the only feasible alternative, the anti-utopian utopia that would reflect an era of disenchantment. Not a few legal scholars held this proposal, recovering a formalist and dogmatic view of Law. Crits will be disarmed in the face of this new juncture, when countless intellectuals will proclaim the emergence of a post-ideological time.
In 2009, Peter Gabel will list some factors that, in his opinion, would have contributed to the collapse of the Critical Legal Studies. By the way, the author teaches:
In my view, CLS "stopped", or perhaps "paused," about fifteen years ago because it lost track of this spiritual and moral foundation. One reason for this was the dissipation of the social movements of the spiritual dimension visible to CLS teachers and writers and audible to our listeners and readers. A second reason influencing the dissipation of the movements themselves was the collapse of socialism and the Marxism that had supported it, which for 150 years provided the principal methaphor for the morally transcendent communal horizon against which the shortcomings of the present society had been measured. A third factor intimately bound up with the other two was the rise of the New Right as a conservative moral response to the social challenge and disruption that the movements of the '60s had introduced into public space, with the Reagan Revolution championing that the movements of the '60s had introduced into public space, with the Reagan Revolution championing deregulation, an attack on entitlement programs, and an originalist, new-federalist constitutionalism that sought to delegitimate the public sphere itself as an arena of collective moral action. 
Knowledge and Politics
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, the first work of this Brazilian intellectual will be the main and fundamental reference for the studies of crits -, Unger believes that the "utopian approaches" were the least explored by critical theories of Law, so that the iconoclastic face of Postmoderns was not sufficiently complemented by their planner dimension.
Therefore, they could not mobilize subsequent generations, forcing them into action.
Conclusion
Liberal left-wing, refusing to advocate in the name of absolute values or to unite totalizing world views (which, in its judgment, would be fatally "totalitarian"), allows Recovering the utopian dimension of Critical Legal Studies would be precisely inflating them with passion. Against the principle of reality, the mark of liberalism, it would revive the principle of pleasure. Future in the past: had it not been hindered by the rise of neoliberalism, the development of Critical Legal Studies could have led to more dense programs of democratic planning and institutional rearrangement. This path, which was projected beyond the trashing, was still discouraged in its early moments, remaining as a latent track that must be followed. In Gabel's view, this way could overcome the standoffs faced in the 1990s by crits.
Unger and Gabel's attempts to foster social order rearrangements were not enough to preserve the utopianism of Critical Legal Studies. To protect themselves from the rationalist and falsifying approaches typical of liberalism, crits have embraced, more often than not, irrationalist convictions, viewing with distrust any measure of social planning. Gabel believes that such an orientation eventually weakened the group; the legal scholar longed for the restoring of Critical Legal Studies as a "spiritual practice," a source of faith:
"We [CLS] really were motivated by love, but it was a love that dared not speak its name. And in my opinion, that is because our movement was infected with the same fear of the other that underlay the injustices that we criticized in the wider society" 
